I. Introduction
In his essay on "Objectivity" in Social Science and Social Policy Weber states that: Parsons places this statement at the beginning of his 'Structure of Social Action' as an indica tion of his attempt to make clear the founda tions for a general sociological theory that would take the 'action frame of reference' as its foundation.
It is now generally but not universally agreed that as Weber's work developed, the sociological and potentially sociological element became more prominent1. For example, his discussions and use of the ideal type show an increasing awareness of the difficulties involved in a move ment of interest away from investigations with in the framework of cultural history towards the elaboration of general concepts that would make possible sociological generalisation and ex planation. In his work on comparative social structure he is less concerned with the motives and intentions of action than with the structure of systems of belief that mould its course and content. His ideal types of legitimate rule, for example, are defined primarily as systems of be lief, although Weber did think that they ought to be redefinable in individualistic and probabil istic terms. It can be argued that the distinction between 'Wert' and 'Zweck' rationality estab lishes the difference between these two modes of analysis1 2. Weber's insistence upon the exclusion of valuejudgements from scientific inquiry does not contradict his insistence upon the critical role of value-relations in determining a field of in vestigation. In Weber's view the demand for value-neutrality must presuppose the existence or, at least, the possibility of objective know ledge. The results of scientific inquiry must be valid for all individuals irrespective of their per sonal evaluations. Weber defines his own stand point:
purpose of such self-clarification of value stand points is to produce a sense of responsibility. A Social Science that investigates the inner struc ture of values can be a foundation for rational political practice. Weber's insistence upon the autonomy of values is a demand for their free dom from 'scientific' or 'pseudo-scientific' jus tifications.
In a basic sense Weber's concept of methodology requires the systematic investigation of the pre suppositions and values involved in the value-re lated inquiries of social science. However, Weber is also clear that the basic presupposition that scientific knowledge is worth having cannot it self be demonstrated by scientific means. This means that, in Weber's terms, the presupposi tions of Science can only be 'interpreted' with reference to ultimate values which we either re ject or accept according to our "ultimate posi tion towards life" . (Weber 1919 (Weber , in 1951 (Weber : 583, in 1948 . The demand for an avoid ance of value-judgements in scientific practice cannot be weakened by a demonstration of the technical difficulties involved in such a demand because it is moral in character. It ap peals to a sense of honesty, and the necessity to face 'inconvenient facts'. (Weber 1919 (Weber , in 1951 in 1948: 147) .
Stated briefly, Weber's viewpoint is that we can infer from our experience that in terms of our theoretical language reality is boundless and inexhaustible. Scientific concepts can only em brace aspects of reality. All concepts represent a selection; they cannot reproduce reality. The problem in interpreting Weber's use of the con cept of 'value-relations' is that, at least, in his earlier essays he strenuously opposes the notion that 'value-related' inquiry is equivalent to 'sub sumption under general concepts'. He seems to follow Rickert in distinguishing between an ini tial practical value-relation and a subsequent re flective 'rotation' of value-relations, but at no point does he indicate that the values active in a value-relation must be granted normative validity. In fact, it is essential to Weber's argument that the object of study be related to values other than the initial guiding value. This is the essence of his opposition to intuitionism with which he contrasts the act of concept formulation that must force clarity upon the investigator.
Rejecting or, at least, ignoring Rickert's argu ments concerning the normative features of value-related inquiry and also denying that a value-relation is not equivalent to subsumption under general concepts, Weber had the problem of how criteria for the selection of data are to be justified. Given his own notion of social reality, the data used by the sociologist can not decisively influence the construction of valuerelated approaches. For example, Weber is quite clear that an institution may be termed 'eco nomically relevant' from the investigator's point of view, even when that institution has not been "deliberately created or used for economic ends" . (Weber 1904 (Weber , in 1951 in 1949: 64) . The construction of value relations is achieved by a scholar in terms of his own inter ests and it is an essential element of scholarship to strive for original value-relations. In this sense, the construction of a value relation and the mode of inquiry associated with it is a highly subjective affair. The values concerned need not, of course, be thought of as the pro duct of the scholar's own thought, they are not his private property nor his private language, but they are an elaboration or interpretation of the values of his own society. Whatever the sta tus of the values that enter into value-relations one thing is clear. Weber does not refer to, and in some ways rejects, any reference to their validity.
Weber, especially in his earlier essays, is quite clear in stating that his conception of valuerelation is not to be confused with subsump tion under general concepts. The historical ele ment is paramount despite the recognition that the analysis of values has a status that is "beyond history" . (Weber 1906 (Weber , in 1951 in 1949: 147) The construction of value-re lations involves "taking an attitude" towards the individuality of a social phenomenon. Fur ther, the relevant 'value-standpoints' are not concepts but are an "individually structured" "feeling and preference" . (Weber 1906 (Weber , in 1951 in 1949: 150) . At the level of theoretical inquiry 'historical individuals' are constructed in terms of their possible evaluation and their cultural rather than their causal significance. All historical individuals posses a potential inex haustibility of content which is their fundamen tal characteristic and this defies all attempts to erect non-trivial general laws. Weber's conception of the guiding values is essentially subjective, although he does remark on the possibility of a systematic theory of interpretation. In Weber's view all social science concepts are 'fictions' and no complex of fictional concepts can be ex haustive of reality. In short, it could be argued that Weber maintains his insistence upon the crucial role of value relations because he wants to distinguish between the typical interests and peculiarities of the methods of the natural and the social sciences while at the same time assum ing that objective knowledge is made possible because both groups of science share "the rules of logic and method (Weber 1919 (Weber , in 1951 in 1948: 143) 3.
"It has been and remains true that a systematically correct scientific proof in the social sciences, if it is to achieve its purpose, must be acknowledged as correct even by a Chinese -or -more precisely stated -it must constantly strive to attain this goal, which per haps may not be completely attainable due to faulty data. Furthermore, the successful logical analysis o f the content of an ideal and its ultimate axioms and the discovery o f the consequences which arise from pursu ing it, logically and practically, must also be valid for the Chinese. At the same time, our Chinese can lack a " sense" for our ethical imperative and he can and certainly often will deny the ideal itself and the con crete value-judgements derived from it. Neither of these two latter attitudes can affect the scientific value o f the analysis in any way." (Weber 1904 (Weber , in 1949 : 58-9; in 1951: 155-156).
Weber's social science presupposes this logical unity of natural and social science yet at the same time it is tied to an underlying historicist standpoint. If our value-related inquiries can never be completely integrated into reality-de scribing theoretical systems, if all knowledge of social reality is always knowledge from par ticular points of view, then Sociology progresses through a perpetual reconstruction of its central concepts and this process itself reflects or is tied to the cultural and social problems of the age within which the investigator lives. More importantly, value-relations enter into the formation of natural scientific theories and prob lems to a greater extent than Weber realised. In fact, Weber, in the 'Protestant Ethic' and else where, hints at the role of religious motivation in the promotion of natural science5. In this case it is clear that "a value interest" does not necessarily concentrate upon 'concrete individ uality' (Parsons 1937b: 596) . The urge "to know God through his works was directed to the element of order in the physical world, and thus to those aspects of it that could be for mulated in abstract and general terms". It can be argued that Weber's own distinction between the sciences rests upon his diagnosis of the 'dis enchantment of the world' which is reinforced by a tendency derived from contemporary phi losophy to exaggerate the substantive unity of the natural sciences.
Parsons' account of the structure of theory is such that, whatever the motives that guide the original interest of the scientist, there is an in herent tendency for the theoretical structures of all sciences to become logically closed sys tems. The correspondence between 'disinterest edness' and 'instrumentality' will result in the formation of an integrated theoretical system and when this occurs there exists an emergent and purely theoretical basis for interest in the phenomena that are to be investigated that itself is incapable of being reduced to either of its constitutive guiding interests. This idea of the immanence and autonomy of theoretical understanding is fundamental to all of Parsons' work. For example, in this characteristic state ment Parsons argues that:
"It is clear that the Weltanschauung and the scientific theories o f an eminent scientist cannot be radically dissociated. But this is no reason to believe that there is not an immanent process o f the development o f science itself." (Parsons 1937b: 27) From Parsons' perspective, Weber could not adequately recognize that the value-related aspect of inquiry is 'controlled' by the autono mous logic of theoretical systems. Weber's own understanding of science and its development is weakened by his inability to recognize in any consistent manner that the conceptual structure of a science will organize the data from which any selection is to be made. To be sure, Weber does, of course, recognize that: Parsons is more concerned with an ideal of scientificity that emphasizes the priority of a conceptual scheme. If "observation is always in terms of a conceptual scheme" then there can be no boundary or "radical distinction in principle between the natural and the social sciences with regard to the roles o f in dividuality and generality." (Parsons 1937b : 597)°T he idea of value-relations as a general selective principle can make clear the element of rela tivism in social inquiry but it is applicable in the sense outlined by Parsons to both the natur al and the social sciences.
The division between the sciences is principally one of emphasis between 'individualising' and 'generalising' sciences and this distinction is not to be reduced to a distinction between natural and social science. The 'generalising' and 'analyti cal' sciences are primarily concerned with the creation of general systems of theory applicable to a wide range of phenomena. "In the natural science field theoretical physics is the leading example, but chemistry and general biology may also be included; in the social sciences theoretical economics is by far the most highly developed, but it is to be hoped that theoretical sociology and certain others will find a place by its side." (Parsons 1937b: 598) Parsons' hopes for the theoretical development of sociology are clearly evident in his discus sion of the relationship between sociological and economic theory. He is highly critical of the view of Löwe that in the relationship between the two sciences it is the role of sociology to supply 'principia media' which are no more than supplementary structural descriptions of the cultural and institutional framework within which economic activity occurs. It is important to note that a central feature of Parsons' mis givings about the role of these 'principia media' is that the principal of historical relativity is fundamental to their status. Parsons asks and answers his own rhetorical question: In Parsons' account Weber is to be commended for avoiding the extremes of both 'reification' ('the fallacy of misplaced concreteness') and theoretical 'irrationalism', in the sense of a denial of the validity of general concepts, and 7 On 'principia media' see Mannheim (1940) .
for combining the essential properties of both science and action. It is Parsons' argument that as science in particular and human action in general both operate through the medium of values they both share the same relativistic foundation. Once this has been recognized it is clear that as scientific inquiry can be analysed as a mode of action without destroying its claim to objectivity then rational action itself requires the existence of objective verifiable knowledge:
"A knowledge of action and its elements is indispens able to ground the methodology o f science and, vice versa, scientific knowledge itself constitutes an element indispensable to the analysis o f action." (Parsons 1937b: 600) If rational action and the objectivity of science are connected in this manner, then the concepts and theories produced through the operation of value-relations, must, if valid, be 'translatable' either into each other or into another theoreti cal language held in common. As far as Parsons is concerned, if a complete relativism of theories is to be avoided, the 'solidarity' of science and action is an essential ingredient in his argument.
"Thus Weber's principle of value relevance, while it does introduce an element o f relativity into scientific methodology . . . does not involve the scepticism that is the inevitable consequence o f any really radical re lativity." (Parsons 1937b: 601) The "really radical relativity" that Parsons has in mind is that implied in his interpretation of the epistemological implications of Mannheim's and Durkheim's work. The problem of the na ture and purpose of theories and concepts still remains. In Parsons' interpretation Weber's notion of the ideal type has a residual character within his system of ideas. Weber's polemical standpoint vis-a-vis both intuitionism and ob jectivism strengthened his view of the fictional character of social scientific concepts. Such concepts can only be relatively useful fictions that can never function as descriptions of a pre-given social reality. The main criterion of their usefulness is the ability to enhance our interpretations of the cultural meaning and sig nificance of historical events and social pheno mena. Weber, apart from stressing their utopian character, does not give a positive or clear iden tification of their qualities but stresses that they are neither hypotheses, nor descriptions and are certainly not class concepts.
Nevertheless, Weber did use an 'ideal type' con cept of a generalising character. This is usually a construction of a hypothetical course of events, although it still has the property of be ing a 'one-sided exaggeration of empirical reali ty'. In Parsons' view when such concepts are applied to situations which are not ideal exper imental conditions for a theory they are placed in a dilemma. They must be regarded as being either an illegitimate reification of a single theoretical system or merely as convenient fic tions. Weber's work culminates into a 'mosaic' of ideal types which, allied with his preference for the use of rational nouns, leads to an ex aggeration of the inevitability of the process of rationalization. Weber could not recognize the need for an inquiry into the systematic inter relationships between his ideal types. His insist ence upon the role of value-relations implies an interest in the 'historical individual' rather than in the construction of empirical generalisa tions or conceptual classifications. This view if clearly expressed in his critique of some cri tics of Rickerts, including Eulenberg, where he states that: rectly stated the logical independence of the standards of objectivity, and of 'schema of proof from the threat of relativism. Further, as noted, the realisation of the 'solidarity of science and action' destroys the claims of ex treme relativism. However, it is in discussing Weber's notion of the plurality of value standpoints that Parsons makes the highly questionable statement that Weber also argued that the number of possible 'ultimate value systems' is, in fact, limited (Par sons 1937b: 601)9. Parsons argues that there must be a limited number of constructed hi storical individuals and of theoretical systems. Parsons interpretation (or, possibly, misinterpre tation) of Weber on this point, although not strictly necessary for his argument concerning the existence of objective sociological know ledge, allows him to connect the principle of value relations with his own view of scientific knowledge. For Parsons, it must follow that there is "in principle" a finite totality of pos sible social knowledge which, while not a "complete reflection" of the " totality of con ceivable objective reality" does stand in a func tional relation to it." "If this element of relativism in sicence is not to lead to sceptical consequences, it is necessary to postulate that in this sense the possible points o f view are o f a limited number." (Parsons 1937b: 756) Opaque as these statements may be, they are an essential foundation for the structure of Parsons' theoretical system and an indication of its di vergence from the spirit of Weber's. Parsons can sympathize with, but must limit the scope of, Weber's affirmation that the social and histori cal sciences are sciences of 'eternal youth' whose ideal types can only be transient. For Parsons the development of sociological knowledge as science must be characterised as "a process of asymptotic approach to a limit" (Parsons 1937b: 601) 
III. Relativism as a Problem
In Parsons' overall account of the methodology of social action theory the introduction of this principle of the progressive development of sci entific knowledge constrains the operation of value-related enquiry and avoids the possibility of scepticism founded upon notions of the ge neral conceptual relativism inherent in sociologi cal thought. From Parsons' point of view Weber's misunderstanding of the true nature of scientific abstraction in terms of its fragmentation of the coherence of both historical individuals and of historical 'chains of events' lead him to erect, as a general theoretical statement, what is, in ef fect, no more than a 'mosaic' of ideal types which itself presupposes an implicit and more general theory of their interrelation and of their rationale. Weber could not supply such a theory precisely because his insistence upon the creative role of value relations implies an over-riding in terest in the investigation of unique social phe nomena which, in his view, is incompatible with the formulation of concepts of a high level of abstraction. This aspect of Weber's 'heroic posi tivism' is shown in his insistence upon the elimi nation of metaphysical inquiry from sociology. A consequence of this is the argument that we should not seek general concepts, laws and theories which allow the 'atomisation' of social reality. The Weberian alternative to explicit ge neral theorising is the classification of possible types of social action and social relationships.
Despite the detail and complexity of Parsons' commentaries on Weber's methodology, there is one aspect that emerges. Given the problem of conceptual relativism implied by a theory of investigation that stresses the role of value re lations, Parsons' solution is to put forward what, in its essentials, appears to have the form of a transcendental argument as an attempt to com bat the scepticism and relativism that has been a constant companion to thd development of sociological thought. In other words, its cate gories are necessary for, and are presupposed by, experience. Parsons' interpretation of We ber's use of the means-end relationship is intend ed to be the non-relative foundation for the analysis of rival or coexisting theories and as the foundation for cumulative theoretical de velopment. Why should the 'unit act' and the action framework be fundamental? Parsons' answer, at first glance, is simple but not neces sarily persuasive:
"It is sufficient to point out that, just like the schema of the classical physics, it is deeply rooted in the common-sense experience o f everyday life, and it is of a range o f such experience that it may be regarded as universal to all human beings." (Parsons 1937b : 5 1 )10 * Parsons' argument is that any phenomenon to which the theory applies may be described as a system of action and such a system can even tually be analysed in terms of its most basic 'atom', the 'unit act'. The unit act itself is com posed of an end, conditions, means, and a norm or set of norms that govern the way in which a means towards an end is selected. If all social theories can be analysed in terms of action then action itself can only be thought of in terms of the ends-means framework. The principle of relativity can apply to the specific modes of its application and to the values which it embodies but it cannot apply to the form of the schema itself. Parsons' argument rests upon the assump tion that the set of fundamental categories he elucidates is unique to social theoretical dis course. It would appear to be impossible to de monstrate such uniqueness and the underlying assumptions of the theory must remain as pre suppositions that cannot be falsified but can be either eroded or undermined by critical analysis and the subsequent development of theoretical strategies that themselves may presuppose a uniqueness argument. Given the presupposition of the coherence and uniqueness of the 'action frame of reference' Parsons argues that 'at least some' of the general concepts that he uses are not 'fictions' in the sense that he ascribes to Weber's usage, but that they grasp aspects of the social world. This 'analytical realism' asserts that its concepts do not correspond to total phenomena but to analytically separable ele ments. The assumption is that the more coher ent a theory becomes then the more adequately will it correspond to the analytical elements of its domain of application. Of course, this idea presupposes an orderly knowable 'social order' which is not just a 'factual order' amenable to scientific analysis but is also a 'normative order'. It is for this reason that Parsons poses the 'problem of social order' as being funda mental to social theory. However, given the role that this 'problem' plays in the total Parsonian approach it is clear that this 'problem' can only be interpreted in terms of Parsons' own account of utilitarianism. There is no 'general problem of social order', as some have argued, outside of the Parsonian problematic. (Parsons 1937b : 8 7 -1 2 5 )11 On the basis of the action framework Parsons is able to clarify, in his earlier work, the clas sification of the social sciences. This classifi cation plays a vital role in Parsons' delimita tion of the scope of sociology. In his account there have been three ways in which sociology has been defined. Firstly it has been construed as a broadly encyclopaedic compendium of the knowledge we possess concerning man and society. As such it does not rest upon any spe cific set of theoretical principles. Secondly, the 'narrow encyclopaedic' view sees sociology be ing concerned with a synthesis of the 'sciences of action' without reference to the conditions of action. Thirdly, there is the 'specific' view according to which sociology is given its own subject matter. Parsons revealingly mentions Simmel's 'formal sociology' as the only me thodologically selfconscious precursor of his own adherence to this perspective. Essential to Parsons' account is the argument that it is only possible to speak of independent sciences when ever there exists a coherent system of theory which is not translatable into the terms of an other science. In nonempiricist terms Parsons stresses that the unit of reference for an anal ytical science is not a particular 'historical in dividual ' or class of individuals but a closed sys tem of theory. An empiricist methodology of the type criticized here assumes a classification of the sciences on a 'historical' basis and the limitation of theoretical development to typol ogy construction and empirical generalization. The consequence of any attempt to theorize on this basis is the illegitimate reification of theories. Parsons, in illustrating this argument, points to the theoretical impasse produced by the institutionalist critique of classical econom ic theory.
IV. Parsons' Idea of a Social Science
In his early work Parsons indicates the develop ment of three general theoretical systems. They are the systems of nature, action and culture. The first two are truly scientific in 'Parsons' ac count because they necessarily involve analysis in terms of 'processes in time'. The basic co ordinates of the first system are space and time, and for the second system the means-end sche ma. However, with an indication of the special role that culture plays in his later work, Parsons argues that the cultural system presents certain difficulties or, at least, peculiarities. Culture is neither spatial nor temporal, it consists of Verifiable knowledge of such 'eternal objects' is possible not in terms of a 'causal understand ing of events' but as an understanding of 'the interrelations of eternal objects in meaningful systems'. Systems of culture are, in part, the product of action and, in turn, are the condi tions of action. Parsons adds that:
"from the causal point o f view we must grant to them the relation to action a certain Eigengesetzlichkeit. A thought process which is a process of action is canalis ed by logical considerations. The system o f logic, a culture system, is a causal element in the concrete re sult." (Parsons 1937b: 764) .
Within this perspective Parsons situates the so ciology of knowledge as a discipline that is con cerned with the interrelations between action and culture.
From the standpoint of his notion of the unit act Parsons argues that the classification of the sciences of action can, initially, be made in terms of the emergent properties derived from the increasing complexity of systems of action. The first emergent property is economic ration ality. Economic theory is concerned with the relationship between economic rationality and other aspects of action and, following this argu ment, if this emergent property can be made the 12 For another discussion o f this see Parsons (1933-4) . The terminology o f 'external objects' appears to be borrowed from Whitehead.
basis of a coherent theoretical system there does not seem to be any obvious reason why this should not also be true of the other emergent properties. If it is argued that only economic theory can attain this status then sociology be comes a residual science. Parsons' critique of Pareto is essentially along these lines. In Pareto's methodology sociology is concerned with the analysis of non-logical action and the description of social systems. It cannot attain the same de gree of coherence that economic theory posses ses.
The second emergent property that Parsons mentions is 'coercive rationality'. Coercion is the exercise of power over others. It is not a property of a total system of action but can only apply to some individuals or groups of in dividuals in their relationship to others. Parsons adds: The fact of coercion creates the famous 'Hobbesian problem of order', the main premise of which is the unlimited struggle for power in a 'state of nature'. Parsons deduces from the 'state of nature' argument that:
"In order that there may be a stable system o f action involving a plurality o f individuals there must be nor mative regulation o f the power aspect o f the relations o f individuals within the system; in this sense there must be a distributive order." (Parsons 1937b: 768) The emergent property of power relations and their normative control is termed the 'political action element' but Parsons has always had great difficulty in arguing from this that there is anything like an autonomous 'science of poli tics'.
The solution of the problem of power implies social integration in terms of a common value system which, for example, is demonstrated by the existence of legitimate norms, common ultimate ends of action and ritual. The emergent property of "common-value integration" is the domain of sociology which Parsons is able to define as The basic properties of the unit act form the methodological basis for the three sciences of action rather than itself being the subject mat ter for an autonomous science. In addition there is scope for a science of psychology as an analytical science concerned with the proper ties of action systems that are derivable from the hereditary basis of personality. The content of immediate ends and norms is also amenable to study in terms of what Parsons describes as the 'technologies'. While maintaining the logical distinctions between the analytical sciences Par sons is also clear that they are all subsystems of the more inclusive general theory and that their interrelationsships must be close.
Once again it is more than clear that the accept ance of Parsons' classification of the sciences means that sociology is destined to be, and in deed, can only progress as an analytical science on the same basis as economic theory. Parsons' objection to Weber's methodology is precisely that according to its definition of sociology and its place among the 'cultural sciences' it is a historical and general social science that includes both the economic and the political levels as de fined by the theory of action. Parsons' meta theory produces a definition of the concept of 'society' that must lead analysis towards forma lism:
"Society is but an element in the concrete whole o f human social life, which is also affected by the factors o f heredity and environment as well as by the element o f culture -scientific knowledge and techniques, re ligious, metaphysical and ethical systems of ideas and forms o f artistic expression. Society cannot exist apart from these things; they play a part in all its concrete manifestations, but they are not society, which com prises only the complex o f social relationships as such." (Parsons 1934: 231) Parsons' insistence upon the necessity for the creation and, in fact, latent existence of, an autonomous body of analytical theory in socio logy must be seen not just in terms of an ap preciation of Weber's methodological insights but as an attack upon the relativistic implica tions that were exploited by the classical socio logy of knowledge that derived from Hegelian and Marxist roots represented especially by the early work of Mannheim. Parsons is clear that although it is probably true to say that a 'Welt anschauung' and a scientific theory cannot easily be dissociated it is also part of his own theory to state that there is also an immanent process of development in science itself. sation of science from the earliest discussions of the distinctive role of the professions to the more recent concern with the structure of high er education and the subsystem of 'cognitive rationality'14.
The distinct nature of the Parsonian concept of social science is important because, despite criti cisms of the substance of Parsonian function alism, it is certainly consistent with a major part of the contemporary orthodoxy concerning social science methodology. For Parsons, the progress of social science requires the develop ment of a body of general theory that in turn requires the autonomy of the science-based pro fessions within a highly differentiated social system. For Weber the "progress" of social science can only be characterised in terms of a discontinuous process of conceptual reconstruc tion that itself is substantively tied to the de velopment of 'practical cultural problems'. If Parsons rejects the historicist implication of Weber's methodology and feels that Weber is unnecessarily confused concerning the role of values in social science then he certainly re jects the more radical critiques of Weber's methodology15. In rejecting the arguments of critics such as Habermas and Rossi, that valuerelations do not merely define the choice of possible objects for investigation but are also active in the formation of theories, Parsons goes so far as to claim that Weber's 'fourth position' that rejected idealist historicism, utilitarianism and Marxism, in fact, heralded the 'end of ideology' (Parsons 1967b: 100) .
Parsons' notion of the progress of sociological thought rests upon the presupposition that the 'analytical realism' of sociological theory is itself made possible because it is in some sense a representation of the inherent order liness of nature and society. The function of theory is to order knowledge in the direction of systematic coherence. The 'Parsonian scientist' is a 'Parsonian actor' whose 'action' is conceivable as a manifestation of the general principles of the social system. The primacy of norms and values in the action frame of reference and the 'effort' of the actor in bringing conditions into conformity with norms is reflected in the Parsonian interpreta tion of Weber's notion of the 'calling' of science. The idea of a social scientific vocation is not interpreted in terms of the heroic personal de tachment of the scholar but in terms of the professional institutionalisation of the values of science within the social system. As has been mentioned this is the source of the antagonism towards the more extreme claims of the tradit ional sociology of knowledge that runs through out Parsons' works. In fact, it could be argued that Parsons' critique of Weber can only be adequately understood not simply in terms of the formal structure of his epistemological and moral presuppositions, but rather in terms of their expression in his persistent animosity to wards the sociology of knowledge. It is not surprising that the methodologies of Weber and Parsons are grounded in opposed philosophies of history, including their images of the future. Despite Parsons' attempts to incorporate the Weberian thesis of increasing rationalisation within his theory of structural differentiation his image of progressive societal evolution is in striking contrast to Weber's "iron cage of serf dom" and future of "long nights of icy dark ness". The process of intellectual rationalisation has the unintended consequence of relativising absolute values and sharpening the irreconcilable value conflicts that Weber saw as a central fea ture of western societies. This is in complete contrast with Parsons' most recent statements concerning the evolution of modern societies and their core 'societal community'16.
16 See, for example, Parsons (1971).
